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Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Tactical Network Topology (TNT) 
experiments seek to develop, implement and identify sensor-unmanned vehicle network, 
and network centric operations to assist DoD warfighters in the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT). Using biometric data for rapid identification of High Value Targets (HVT) in 
ground and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) is critical to the emerging special 
operation concept.  The goal is to explore solutions and operational constraints associated 
with biometrics data analysis and rapid identification by means of adhoc self forming 
sensor unmanned vehicle (UV) wireless networks. 
The objectives of this thesis are to look at how biometrics has performed in a 
testbed environment that is simulating a real special operations environment in theatre. 
This thesis is meant to explore and explain the biometrics process that was conducted on 
top of the tactical network and evaluate its performance.  
This thesis provided the process model for biometrics identification in the tactical 
networks environment.  This thesis also evaluated the length of time that it took to 
transmit the fingerprint data from the field to the ABIS database, with an identification 
result then sent back to the field.  The longest time that was observed was 70 minutes 
(using low bandwidth Satellite communications), while the shortest time was 4 minutes 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Unites States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) - Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Cooperative Field Experimentation Program called, Tactical 
Network Topology (TNT) seeks in part to develop, implement, and identify sensor-
unmanned vehicle network, and network centric operations to assist DoD warfighters in 
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Using biometric data for rapid identification of 
High Value Targets (HVT) in ground operations and Maritime Interdiction Operations 
(MIO) is critical to the emerging special operations concept.  The goal is to explore 
solutions and operational constraints associated with biometrics data analysis and rapid 
identification by means of adhoc self-forming sensor, unmanned vehicle (UV) wireless 
networks. 
A.  PURPOSE 
Security is of the utmost importance and the means for obtaining it is in constant 
research.  The use of biometrics can help with security for both the private and military 
sectors.  Being certain of a person’s true identity is the key.  This is not as easy as it may 
seem.  Even if perfect computers and applications were created that never made mistakes 
and would allow you to positively identify someone, there still is the issue of a “link” 
back to the huge database that stores identities.  Unless you have a portable local database 
that allows you to identify a person on the spot, there is an unprecedented need for 
reachback to the main database.  Only limited situations will allow for one to know which 
individuals need to be readily available in a portable database.  A more common situation 
will call for collection of biometrics and then to send the file containing the unique 
character information back to the national or international central database.  The value of 
communications and networks cannot be under estimated in this biometric equation. 
B.  OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this thesis are to look at how biometrics has performed in a 
testbed environment that is simulating a real special operations environment in theatre. 
This is necessary because the quicker a warfighter is in identifying an HVT and 
determining that the person needs to be detained or not, the quicker the warfighter can get 
2 
out of harms way.   This thesis is meant to explore and explain the biometrics process 
that was conducted on top of the tactical network and evaluate its performance.  
C.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: When biometrics are implemented into a 
concept of operations (CONOPS), how beneficial is it to the warfighter?  To answer this 
question, we will need to: 
• Analyze areas of information and communication technology relevant to 
the (CONOPS) within the TNT testbed. 
• Describe operational solutions for using and sharing biometric data in 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and MIO missions. 
• Identify biometric technologies to meet the user needs. 
• Identify and recommend DoD strategic technology initiatives that could 
effect the types of biometrics used. 
• Identify measures of performance (MOP) for biometrics networking 
D.  SCOPE 
This thesis will provide a broad overview of the TNT testbed with a focus on 
different realms of biometrics and then explain why the specific biometric application of 
fingerprinting was chosen and in what environment it was utilized.   
E.  METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will use research from past biometrics testing in TNT experiments.  It 
will also include data from actual executed CONOPS and from interviewing professors, 
students, Special Operations Forces, and employees of the DoD Biometrics Fusion 
Center. 
F.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I describes the purpose, objectives, research questions, scope, 
methodology and organization of thesis. 
Chapter II explains the history of the field experimentation program at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  It describes in detail the goals of each type of experiment and 
accomplishments that have come from the program, especially those that led to Biometric 
Identification integration.   
3 
Chapter III defines biometrics into two categories, physiological and behavioral, 
and gives examples of both.  It specifies that biometrics are used for identifying and 
authenticating and why this is important in the GWOT. 
Chapter IV discusses the ANSI and NIST standards and methodologies.  This 
chapter spells out the difference between the CJIS/FBI – IAFIS and the DoD BFC – 
ABIS.  It compares EBTS/ EFTS and gives examples of both.  It will also clarify the 
different categories of fingerprints and different categories of submissions. 
Chapter V gives the results from using the BFC ten-print device in a field 
environment.  It explains how this could improve or degrade the effectiveness for the 
warfighter.  It also summarizes the conclusions of this thesis and offers recommendations 
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
FIELD EXPERIMENT PROGRAM 
 
The Naval Postgraduate School faculty and students initiated a program of field 
experimentation in fiscal year (FY) 2002.  In FY 2003 the experimentation transitioned 
into the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Network (STAN), with a primary focus on 
USSOCOM requirements.  It was then that it took shape and started to form into a 
program that gained involvement from multiple departments within the school.  To date 
the experimentation program has had over 30 faculty involved and has over 60 students 
who have graduated with STAN/TNT theses.  Because NPS has a Joint focus, students 
from all services (Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corp.) and many foreign officers are 
involved.  A unique benefit is that most of those students have valuable operational 
experience that they bring to the table.  Through the years USSOCOM and the different 
Component Commands (USASOC, AFSOC, NAVSOC, and JSOC) have come to 
participate in and support the field experiments.   There are many other government 
agencies, contractors, and private companies that also support this program.  
A.   STAN 
Surveillance and Target Acquisition Network (STAN) was formed by the Dean of 
Research, Dr. David W. Netzer and a student, Christopher Manuel, who was the first 
Chief Warrant Officer to attend NPS.  CW2 Manuel, helped to create the first prototype 
called Remote Observation Video Encoded Receiver (ROVER).  This device’s purpose 
was to provide Special Forces soldiers the means to receive Predator video on the tactical 
battlefield.  This had the potential for providing the solider not only red force tracking, 
but blue force tracking also.  “The motivation for providing friendly force positions to 
attack aircraft comes from the untimely death of CW2 Stan Harriman (after whom the 
network was named), killed by an AC-130 H in Afghanistan on 2 March 2002.” (Manuel, 
2004)  “Soldiers, commanders, and members of Other Government Agencies (OGAs) 
considered Predator video delivered at the tactical level as "leap ahead" technology” 
(Manuel, 2004).  (ROVER is now in its third iteration and has high level support.) CW2 
Manuel felt strongly that there was a need for better situational awareness (SA) via 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) products to prevent fratricide.  The main objective for 
STAN was “meant to reduce soldiers load, increase combat effectiveness, provide 
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situational awareness, increase standoff, reduce reliance on satellites, increase 
survivability, reduce fratricide find and fix enemy personnel and equipment.”   (STAN 6 
Brief)  
 
Figure 1. Example of what current SOF warfighters have to carry into battle 
 
One of the main accomplishments of STAN was the creation of Inter-4’s 
lightweight handheld PDA device, called the Tacticomp (see Figure 2).  The Tacticomp 
allows a solider to send or receive video, data, and voice with or without infrastructure 
(Manuel).  It is combat ready, in that it has been demonstrated to be ruggedized to the 
point of withstanding a 22-caliber gunshot.  The Tacticomp graphically displays its 
location and the location of other devices that are a part of that network in its SA screen.  
When using a MESH (non-infrastructure) wireless card it has the ability to join a network 
ad hoc by self-forming and self-healing.  The range of this device varies depending on 
which type of wireless card is used and if there is amplification.     
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Figure 2. Inter-4’s Tacticomp  
 
Many other notable accomplishments took place during the STAN experiments.  
One notable one is the installation of the long-haul, high bandwidth wireless backbone 
between NPS in Monterey and Camp Roberts.  It’s a 100 mile distance using 
OFDM/802.16 technology.  This allowed the network operation center (NOC) in 
Monterey to see exactly what was going on at the tactical operation center (TOC) in 
Camp Roberts, and to participate interactively. 
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Figure 3. 100 mile backbone from Monterey to Camp Roberts and various sites 
 
Another was the successful use of Red Team Intent (RTI), which is a program 
that NPS Professor John Hiles created in conjunction with a Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL) program called SONOMA.  It takes a video that is 
surveying a city and allows the operator to input a particular pattern to look for.  For 
example if it is known that a driver of a car which slows down to five miles per hour for 
more than 100 feet is suspicious activity, then the program will highlight the paths of all 
vehicles that have this exact activity.  The clever part about this program is once the 
pattern has been triggered, one can rewind the video and see where the suspicious vehicle 
came from.   
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Figure 4. RTI screen shot 
 
Additionally, there were ship-to-shore experiments conducted using the 
802.16/OFDM technology.  The results were good considering that 802.16 was not 
designed to operate near the water surface, which adds unfavorable atmospheric and 
surface conditions.  The boat was able to go 13 km out to sea and still get connectivity 
with the NOC.  Video and VoIP were passed at 12Mbs.  These are just a few of the many 
and varied accomplishments that came to fruition from the STAN experiments. 
B.  TNT 
Starting in FY05 STAN transitioned again and became the Tactical Network 
Topology (TNT) program.  The name change was made primarily because USSOCOM 
developed programs of record from STAN efforts and a wider range of technologies were 
being explored.  With the transition of STAN to TNT came more involvement from the 
Component Commands.  Now the scenarios and experiments that are utilized are 
developed from this working group of NPS, USSOCOM J9, and all USSOCOM 
Component Commands.  The more mature technologies are usually carried from one set 
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of experiments to the next.  The goal of having a Cooperative Field Experimentation 
Program is to “focus on identifying key gaps and deficiencies resulting from applications 
of advanced technology, particularly network communications, unmanned systems and 
net-centric applications”. (TNT 05-4 AAR)  The quarterly field experiments have the 
following structure:   
• One week in Camp Roberts:  
 1-2 days: setting up Ground Control Stations (GCS’s), networks, etc. 
 1-2 days: conducting individual experiments which evaluate new and 
emerging technologies. 
 2 days: running scripted scenarios to evaluate integrated technologies in a 
tactical environment. 
 1 day: engineering day – evaluating and deciding upon which technologies 
will be used in following experiments.   
• 3 days of Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) and Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO) in Monterey Bay or off of San Francisco Bay: 
 1 day: set up 
 1-2 days: running MIO experiment and testing underwater technologies 
An example of a scenario that occurs in Camp Roberts for TNT could involve a 
convoy of hummers consisting of an ODA (Operation Detachment Alpha) team that has 
biometrics equipment.  The ODA stops at a set of buildings and secures one, finds 
potential WMD (weapons of mass destruction) material in another building and leaves a 
surveillance camera that detects motion.  In the third building the ODA team finds an 
HVT (high value target) and brings the suspect out to the LRV (Light Reconnaissance 
Vehicle) where the biometric equipment is located and takes the HVT’s rolled finger 
prints or ten-print.  LRV personnel send the ten-print, one MB file to the TOC and from 
the TOC, it is sent up the 100 mile 802.16 backbone to the NPS NOC.  Once at the NOC 
the ten-print is sent via hardware VPN (virtual private network) to the Biometrics Fusion 
Center (BFC).  BFC then provides the positive identification of the HVT.  The HVT is 
detained.  An RFID (radio frequency identification) sensor detects a threat vehicle, which 
shows up in the SA in the TOC.  The TOC provides the location to an unmanned aerial 
system (UAS) that will find and track the threat vehicle, providing surveillance video to 
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the TOC.  The video shows that the threat vehicle has come to a stop and the driver has 
exited.  TOC directs the UAS to fly high and continue surveillance, while the NPS SUAV 
(small unmanned aerial vehicle) is directed to fly to the threat vehicle and lock video on 
target.  Then the video is fed into software which will determine the coordinates of the 
target within a one to two meter accuracy.  Once the GPS coordinates are determined the 
SUAV lands and the MMALV (micro morphing air-land vehicle) flies out to the vehicle, 
lands, and crawls under the vehicle.  The camera, which normally faces forward during 
flight, flips up and gathers images of the IED that has been placed in the underbelly of the 
threat vehicle.  TOC commander confirms this IED material and sends directions to the 
ODA to return to the TOC on an alternate route, so not to pass by the IED vehicle.  Some 
high level objectives for a scenario of this type would be:   
1. Determine the effect of different wireless communication methods 
(SOF-TOC and TOC - remote sites) on mission effectiveness and duration 
during a HVT search mission.  
  2. Determine utility of multiple UASs, ground sensors, precision 
jammers, and SIGINT target locaters integrated in the Tactical Network 




Figure 5. Pictorial description of a possible TNT scenario 
 
The experiments that have been conducted during the 3 day maritime section of 
the TNT have been varied.  The AUV portion has included experiments that examined: 
• Navigation, communication and control of multiple vehicles (via acoustic 
modems)  
• Obstacle avoidance (via forward looking sonar) 
• Mine locating in littoral (TNT05-1 Brief, slide 7) 
13 
  
Figure 6. NPS AUV Aeries 
  
Figure 7. Aries forward looking sonar image 
 
Most of these tests have been done with naval special operations missions in 
mind.  During combat swimming situational awareness is greatly desired.  Inter-4 made 
an underwater PDA, called the NAVBOARD to give the swimmer way points to follow 
while underwater.  NPS modified the NAVBOARD to permit situational awareness (SA) 
to be sent to the submerged swimmer via a wireless network.  Images from aerial 
surveillance of the beach and /or sonar images of mines and their location in the littoral 
could be sent to the swimmer with only a small antenna on the surface. 
This device had varying degrees of success, while the network performed 
reasonably well, the device could not made water tight. 
The other facet of the maritime operations is evaluating technologies that can be 
used in maritime interdiction of a suspect vessel.  In these types of operations 
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communications between the originating ship and the boarded ship is imperative.  This 
has been one of main focuses of the experiments, and we have used a man-packable form 
of 802.16.  It is a portable version of the OFDM technology that can be stored in a 
backpack and carried on board the target ship where it is setup to link back to the 
originating ship.   
Once reliable ship-to-ship and/or ship-to-shore comm’s has been setup, then a 
MESH network is set up on the boarded ship to connect all personnel and equipment on 
the deck.  With MESH networking up and running the BFC connects their equipment 
through it and takes fingerprints of all personnel on the boarded ship.  Now that the deck 
communications has been setup then Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 
goes below deck and sets up their Ultra Wide Band (UWB) network.  The main 
advantage of UWB is that it has LPI/LPD (low probability interception/low probability of 
detection) covertness.  Evaluated in the experiments was the through-wall performance of 
the UWB (low frequency) for below deck communications.  Also evaluated were the 
LLNL technologies for the detection and identification of sources of radiation and their 
Easy Livermore Inspection Test for Explosives (ELITE) shown in Figure 8; a 
colorimetric explosives detection system that detects over 25 explosives and their 
radiating precursors.  
 
Figure 8. Example of Elite Detection 
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The high level objective of the MIO experiment conducted in TNT 05-4 was to 
demonstrate capability of network integration and distributed sharing for (utilizing) new 
radiation detection technology and remote instrument expertise and biometrics databases 
which are geographically distributed. Explore integration  of self-forming  wireless 
networks, including the ultra-wideband links for ship metal structures penetration, 
(together) with advanced  collaborative technology tools, shared  situational awareness 
display, and GIG/DREN wide area connections for bringing the radiation source analysis 
and  biometrics identification remote experts to the support of the boarding party within 
the real-time constraints critical to the boarding party success.  
 
 
Figure 9. Overview of MIO exercise 
 
C.   ROLE OF BIOMETRICS 
The future of the field experimentation program is good.  Continued funding from 
USSOCOM and other sources appears to be in place. Structurally, the program will 
probably follow a format similar to TNT 06-2 :  
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• 22-24 Feb.: RHIB or equivalent out to sea with airborne relay for   
reachback or AUV work in Monterey Bay 
• 25 Feb – 3 Mar: Multiple coordinated SOF operations: Camp Roberts, 
Avon Park, San Diego, and Missoula 
• 5-7 Mar: MIO exercise in Alameda Island and Suisun Bay. 
New elements have been added to TNT 06 experiments.  Doing two separate 
maritime experiments in one quarter has yet to be done, but if one considers everything 
that needs to be evaluated it may occur.  Running multiple missions in multiple locations 
(i.e. Camp Robert and Avon Park) simultaneously is a new element, but desired by 
USSOCOM.   
One needs to investigate how biometrics works on top of an evolving network 
infrastructure.  The variables can include user and network performance, plus operational 











III.  BIOMETRICS FOR TACTICAL NETWORKS 
A.  DESCRIPTION 
A descriptive definition of Biometrics can be found in the Department of Defense 
Biometric Management Office, Biometrics Fusion Center (DoD BMO, BFC) website 
www.biometrics.dod.mil.  It says that biometrics should be measurable, physiological 
and/or behavioral characteristics that can be used to verify the identity of a person.  This 
chapter will explain the two different type of biometrics and then give examples of each.    
B.  DIFFERENT TYPES OF BIOMETRICS 
As mentioned above, the different types of biometrics fall into two categories:  
Physiological and Behavioral.  Physiological biometrics is based upon the recognition of 
physical characteristics, such as fingerprints, hand geometry, iris recognition, and facial 
recognition (Layman’s, 2005).  Behavioral biometrics can be described not as a physical 
characteristic, but are traits that are learned or acquired over time as differentiated from 
physical characteristics. Some examples are: voice, signature or keystroke recognition 
(Layman’s, 2005).   
1.   Physiological Biometrics 
Physiological biometrics are physical traits or attributes that everyone has.  
Fingerprints, irises, and faces are not easily altered.  This is why these are viable options 
for identification and merit further research. 
a. Fingerprinting  
Fingerprinting is the most common form of biometric used to date.  It has 
been in forensic use for over a hundred years.  The reason being is that fingerprints are 
unique to each individual and for the most part do not change over one’s lifetime 
(Polemi, 1997).  Fingerprints patterns are classified by three categories (shown in Figure 
10): arch, loop, and whorl.   
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Figure 10. Example of the three different fingerprint patterns (Patterns, 2006) 
 
Characteristics of fingerprints that make them discrete are called minutiae, forks, or 
endings found in the ridges and the overall shape of the ridge flow.  (Polemi, 1997)  
These distinctive qualities are captured either by one placing their fingers on a 
specialized high resolution scanner or the old fashion way (i.e. paper and ink).  Once the 
digits are digitally captured they are entered into a database.  Standardization of capturing 
methods and information deposits into databases are necessary requirements in order to 
match quickly and correctly. 
The advantages of using fingerprinting is that it a proven biometric (for 
multiple prints) and it is usually accepted in our culture. The disadvantage is that unless it 
is a latent print being lifted of an item, the finger-printed person physically knows that 
there is an attempt to identify him.   
There are many areas of application for fingerprinting.  The following are 
industries that use fingerprinting:  
• Government Agencies 
•  Banking 
• Medical & Insurance Industry 
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• Information Security 
• Identity Authentication  
• Police Department 
• High Power Reactor Stations  
• Immigration and Naturalization Services 
• Airport Traffic Security  
• Welfare & Unemployment Benefit Recipients 
• Identification of Missing Children  
• Database management systems 
• Computer access or transaction control  
• Computer Database Security Control 
• Physical Access Control (Polemi, 1997)   
With so many ways to apply fingerprinting, it will continue to grow as one 
of the leading forms of biometrics, especially ten-prints where misidentification is less 
likely.  
b. Iris  
Iris scanning is considered to be one of the most reliable methods for 
identifying someone.  “The human iris is an annular region between the black pupil and 
the white sclera.” (Wang, 2003)  It is the texture of the iris that provides the unique 
quality.  Other characteristics that make the iris inimitable are connective tissues, 
collageneous stromal fibres, ciliary processes, contraction furrows, rings and colorations. 
(Polemi, 1997)  All together there are over 400 distinctive characteristics in the iris alone 
(Iris, 2006).  “Due to these unique characteristics, the iris has six times more distinct 
identifiable features than a fingerprint” (Iris, 2006). 
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Figure 11. Iris scanners looking for unique identifiers (Iris Recognition, 2000) 
 
 An advantage of iris scanning is that it is protected from the external 
environment.  It is impossible to modify surgically without risking vision, so ultimately 
there is a low risk of impersonation.  One of the biggest benefits is that scanning and 
gathering iris data is done at a short distance without physically touching the subject 
(Polemi, 1997).  Some disadvantages:  susceptible to disease damage (i.e. cataracts), even 
though it can be done at a distance it is still considered to be intrusive and not very user 
friendly, high amount of both user and operator skill required, and inadequate funding 
from government and private sectors (Iris, 2006).   
Possible places that iris scanning could be applied are at: 
• Correction facilities 
• Department of Motor Vehicle 
• Military checkpoints 
• POW facilities 
c. Facial Recognition  
Facial recognition is done everyday, by everyone.  The Automated 
Identification and Data Capture Biometrics website states: 
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Facial feature identification is inherent in all of us.  Individuals can 
immediately distinguish among people just by looking at their face.  As a 
result, facial feature identification is considered to be one of the most 
natural biometric technologies (Facial, 2006).   
With the advent of cameras and other multimedia technology this form of 
biometric has become more popular.  The procedure of conducting facial identification 
involves two processes:  detection and recognition.  In detection a camera needs to be 
able to identify within a frame of video or a photograph that there is a human face and 
then separate it from any other items that could be in that same image (Facial, 2006).  At 
this point software is used to look at the face selected and pick out the identifying 
features, such as: size of nose, shape of eyes, chin, eyebrows, and mouth (Polemi, 1997).  
“After constructing an image of one's face, the software "cuts" away any background 
details leaving the image of one's face in a rectangle frame called a binary mask” (Facial, 
2006).  Using this binary mask enables the software to conduct the recognition portion of 
the process.  Recognition is comparing the collected facial image against other faces that 
are held in a database.  This is a simplified explanation of the process of facial 
recognition and it can be done in various ways.   
 
Figure 12. Facial feature detection (Analyzing) 
 
Advantages of facial recognition are: it is highly acceptable in this culture 
to be identified in this manner and it’s noninvasive, it doesn’t require any physical 
contact.   A disadvantage of facial recognition is that some of the systems and software 
used can be ineffective if the angle, lighting, or facial expression that is captured is 
different than the coinciding image that is held in the database (Polemi, 1997).    Another 
disadvantage is that the database needs constant updating because the aging human 
skeleton is constantly changing (Polemi, 1997).     
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This is a growing field, just a few areas of applications are: 
• Banking 
• Credit Card Companies 
• Social Security Systems 
• Airport Security 
• Hospital / Health Care Institutions (Polemi, 1997).     
2.  Behavioral Biometrics 
Behavioral characteristics are a reflection of an individual's psychological 
makeup, although physical traits, such as size and gender, have a major influence.  These 
behavioral characteristics can be unique enough to measure and identify a person. 
a. Signature 
The specific features of the signature and specific features of the process 
of signing one's signature are the two methods that signature identification 
analyzes.   There are five main features that need to be measured, and they 
are speed, pen pressure, directions, stroke length, and the points in time 
when the pen is lifted from the paper (Signature , 2006).  
Signature identification devices also can analyze the "static" image of 
one's signature.  In using the "static" image method, the signature 
identification device captures the image of one's signature and saves it for 
future comparisons to the stored template (Signature, 2006). 
Advantages for signature identification is that signing is something that 
people have to do every day and is a part of our culture, therefore, this is an accepted 
biometric.  A disadvantage is that this is not a suitable biometric to use in countries that 
have high illiteracy rate (Polemi, 1997). 
b. Keystroke 
Keystroke as a biometric is still underdevelopment.  It measures typing 
characteristics of individuals.  The following are examples of what is measured: 
keystroke duration, inter-keystroke times, typing error frequency, force strokes, etc 
(Polemi, 1997).   
Two kinds of systems are getting developed based upon static and 
dynamic verification techniques.  The static verifier uses a neural network 
approach while the dynamic verifier is using statistics. The static approach 
is where the system analyzes the way a username or password was typed 
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using neural network for pattern recognition.  Dynamic approach is where 
the system verifies the person continuously with any arbitrary text input. 
(Polemi, 1997). 
This is an emerging technology and has much potential in any industry 
that utilizes computers/keyboards on a regular basis.  Because it is not a mature 
biometric, at this point it would be very costly to invest in (Keystroke, 2006).   
c. Voice 
Voice or Speech identification analysis studies the sounds, phonetics, and 
vocals generated by a person.  The individuality of these characteristics are produced by 
the mouth, nasal cavities, and vocal tract which is unique to everyone (Polemi, 1997). 
A voice identification system requires that a “voice reference template” be 
created so that it can be evaluated against new voice entries.  One must speak a set phrase 
several times so that the system can build the reference template.  “Voice identification 
systems incorporate several variables or parameters in the recognition of one's 
voice/speech pattern including pitch, dynamics, and waveform” (Voice, 2006). 
 “There are five specific forms of voice identification technologies that are 
currently available or under development: 
1.  Speaker Dependent 
This type of technology involves "training" the system to recognize your 
speech patterns.  Systems employing this technique can hold a vocabulary 
of between 30,000 and 120,000 words.  Best if used by a specific user.  
2. Speaker Independent  
This type of voice identification technology can be used by anyone 
without having to train the system.  As a trade off, the vocabulary is 
smaller and error rates higher.  
3.  Discrete Speech Input  
This environment involves the person speaking to make small pauses, as 
small as 1/10 of a second, between words.  This allows the system to 
recognize where words begin and end.  
4.  Continuous Speech Input  
Users can speak at a continuous rate but the voice identification software 
can only recognize a limited amount of words and phrases.  This type of 
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technology is also referred to as "word-spotting" systems.  They are called 
"word-spotting" because a user can be speaking in long sentences or 
phrases and the system will only recognize predetermined words.  
5.  Natural Speech Input  
This is the most desired form of voice identification, but is still under 
development.  Here the user is able to speak freely and the system is able 
to interpret and carry out commands on-the-fly.”  (Voice, 2006) 
Advantages of using voice as a biometric is that it provides eyes and 
hands-free operation and is considered a “natural” biometric technology (Voice, 2006).  
Disadvantages are that it is not as accurate as other biometrics, if people are sick or 
unable to speak, that will affect the accuracy of identification.  And verification of people 
who are under the influence, taking dental anesthesia, or have an oral obstruction, is 
extremely difficult (Polemi, 1997). 
Some areas of application: 
• Telephony (hands-free dialing) 
• Used by disabled persons 
• Used by physicians to record patient data and make records while    
conducting observations (Voice, 2006) 
3. Other Biometric Areas 
There are many other biometric areas not discussed in this thesis.  There are so 
many, that the purpose of this chapter was to go into depth with just a few of them.  Other 
biometric areas for research are: 
• Hand Geometry – Vein Patters (Thermal) 
• Retina 
• DNA pattern 
• Ear recognition 
• Odor detection 
• Sweat pores analysis 
• Head analysis 
• Gait 
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It is apparent that obtaining data for more than one type of biometric will 
significantly increase detection accuracy and speed. 
C. IDENTIFICATION VERSUS VERIFICATION 
Identification and verification produce two different results in the biometrics 
world.  “During identification, the biometric system asks, "Who is this?" and establishes 
whether a biometric record exists, and, if so, the identity of the enrollee whose sample 
was matched.  During verification, the biometric system asks, "Is this person who he/she 
claims to be?" and attempts to verify the identity of someone who is using, say, a 
password or smart card.” (Identification, 2006) 
Identification (1:N or one-to-many) in a biometrics system will search for a 
positive identification within a predefined group of individuals.  The matching algorithm 
searches using a biometric sample given by the individual, through each record it has on 
file.  This process is in general slower than verification. (Verification, 2006) 
Verification (1:1 or one-to-one) in a biometrics system will search using a 
matching algorithm for positive identification using both a biometric sample and a unique 
user identifier (e.g. name).  The matching algorithm searches all records on files and the 
result comes back as “Match” or “No-Match.”  This process is relatively simpler and 
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IV. BIOMETRIC STANDARDS  
Similar to what IEEE has done for networking and other applications, 
fingerprinting has also been standardized.  This standardization includes metrics used to 
capture fingerprints and includes minimal requirements needed for the device used.  This 
chapter is meant to briefly explain the standards and how they are meant to be used.   
A. SUMMARY OF DOD ABIS  
DoD ABIS stands for the Department of Defense Automated Biometric 
Identification System.  This is used by the government entities.  It is convenient because 
it is held within a centralized biometric database and can capture multiple types of 
biometric data (Overview, slide 3).  It searches and matches biometric data automatically, 
and then it communicates with client applications (e.g., Biometrics Automated Toolset 
(BAT), Biometrics Identification System for Access (BISA)) (Overview, slide 3).  A very 
important factor is that it easily exchanges data with other organizations (e.g., FBI and 
DHS) (Overview, slide 3).   Implementation of DoD-specific data fields and transactions, 
support of existing transmission specifications, and the use a common data interchange 
format, are all within DoD ABIS to assure enterprise-wide interoperability (Overview, 
slide 3).    
B. SUMMARY OF DOD EBTS 
DoD EBTS also known as Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification, 
focuses on the transactions that are essential to interface with the DoD ABIS (Overview, 
slide 4).   It actually enhances the FBI’s EFTS (Electronic Fingerprint Transmission 
Specification).  While still using many EFTS capabilities, it incorporates additional DoD-
specific information (Overview, slide 4).   It specifies more than just fingerprinting 
standards, but a variety of data types (e.g., iris and face) (Overview, slide 4).   EBTS 
implemented ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 data formats, which will be explained later on in 
this chapter.  Because future use will require programs or implementations that need 
additional functionality, EBTS has extensible domains. EBTS allows EFTS-complaint 
biometric submissions in order to remain compatible with the DoD ABIS.  As stated in 
the DoD ABIS and EBTS Overview Version 1.0: 
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• “DoD EBTS transactions which are submitted to the FBI’s Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) will not be rejected 
• IAFIS ignores additional DoD-specific information 
• Equipment generating DoD EBTS transactions is EFTS-compliant” 
(Overview, slide 4). 
To summarize this means that ABIS (via EBTS) is compatible with the FBI’s 
IAFIS through EFTS.  EFTS is expounded upon in section C. 
C. SUMMARY OF FBI IAFIS / EFTS 
FBI’s EFTS (Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification) implements 
ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 data format, because compliance is required for information 
exchange with the Criminal Justice Information Services Division, which uses the 
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) (Overview, slide 5).  
EFTS accepts submission of fingerprints (10-prints, latent prints), mug shots, photos of 
scars, marks, and tattoos (Overview, slide 5).  Submissions to FBI are called 
“transactions” and multiple Types of Transaction (TOT) are allowed (Overview, slide 5).  
EFTS transactions and data format elements are IAFIS-specific and therefore certain 
biometrics (e.g., iris) are not supported (Overview, slide 5).  Below is a table that briefly 





Table 1. DoD EBTS/EFTS Comparison (From Overview, 2005) 
 
The table above shows many differences between EFTS and EBTS. EBTS has 
military uses, where as EFTS is used in the Criminal Justice system. The significant 
difference between the two transmission specifications is that EBIS can be used for 1:1 
Verification and has started use of Iris identification.   
D. DOD ABIS/EBTS SPECIFICATIONS 
ABIS is collocated with IAFIS, but is maintained by the BFC.  It’s important to 
note what the BFC’s initiatives are: 
• Test and Evaluation  
• Policy Development  
• Standards Development  
• Education Program  
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• Knowledge Management  
• Protection Profiles  
• Product and Industry Research  
• Implementation Support (BFC, 2006) 
To visualize the flow of biometric initiatives, standards, and testing, please see 
Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Flow of Biometric Conformity and assessment Initiatives (From BFC 
Standards, 2006). 
The BFC, keeping with ANSI/NIST standards, has 3 different types of fingerprint 
storage within DoD ABIS.  They are 10-print rolled fingerprint data, flat fingerprint data 
ranging between 1-10 flat prints, and latent fingerprints images (EBTS ver1.1, p3).   
As shown in Table 2 there are several categories of use or submissions for EBTS.  
Below describes what each category means: 
31 
• Red Force, which searches for detainees, enemy combatants, enemy 
prisoners of war (EPWs), or persons of interest (known or suspected 
terrorists). 
• Gray Force submission is used when military personnel are trying to 
identify someone at a check point type of situation or verifying third 
country nationals who are trying to work on a US military base.  
• Blue Force is meant to identify and verify military and contractor 
personnel .  It should be noted that ABIS does not contain the biometric 
files of US citizens.   
• Latent submission is mainly used for forensic purposes.  They are 
normally gathered after the fact, for example one could be lifted of an 
improvised explosive device (IED) (EBTS ver1.1, p3). 
Each type has to be submitted to ABIS with an EFTS/EBTS, transaction of type.  
Table 2 specifies for each submission the corresponding transaction type.  The type of 
submission is important because it qualifies the category in which the newly submitted 
fingerprints should be inputted.  Tables 3 and 4 explain the submissions and 



















Table 3. EBTS Types of Transactions (TOT) (Submissions and Responses) by Category  




Table 4. EBTS Types of Transactions (TOT) (Submissions and Responses) by Category 










E.   ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 DATA FORMAT 
As explained at the beginning of this chapter there are standards that 
manufacturers have to follow if they are trying to build a biometric device.  The Image 
Storage and Retrieval (ISR) devices need to be compliant with the ANSI/NIST 
(American National Standards Institute/National Institute of Standards and Technology) 
1-2000 Data Format standards.  This standard was approved in July 2000 and is currently 
undergoing revisions.    ANSI/NIST formats were implemented in EBTS and EFTS.  
ANSI/NIST facilitates effective exchange of identification data between dissimilar 
systems, using the Common Biometric Exchange File Format (CBEFF).  It also provides 
common format for data exchange (for example they do not have to use Cross Match 
equipment, as long as the equipment is ANSI/NIST compliant).  This data format 
supports several modalities, such as fingerprint, palm, facial, and scar mark/tattoo 
images.  In order to support all of this an extensible data encodings, or XML is used.  
Multiple modalities can be supported using standard biometric data formats 
The following are some areas in which the ANSI/NIST goes into great detail: 
• Transmitted Data Conventions 
 Byte and bit ordering 
 Grayscale data 
 Binary data 
 Color sequence 
• Image Resolution Requirements 
 Both Scanner and transmitting resolution requirements 
• File Description 
 File formats and contents 
 Implementation domains 
 Image designation character (IDC) 
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• Record Description  
 Logical record types (Type-1 through Type-16) 
• Type-1 Transaction record 
• Type-2 User-defined descriptive text record 
• Type-3 Low-resolution grayscale record 
• Type-4 High-resolution grayscale record 
• Type-5 Low-resolution binary record 
• Type-6 High-resolution binary record 
• Type-7 User-defined image record 
• Type-8 Signature image data record 
• Type-9 Minutiae record 
• Type-10 Facial & SMT (scar, mark, and tattoo) image 
record 
• Type-11 Record reserved for future use 
• Type-12 Record reserved for future use 
• Type-13 variable-resolution latent image record 
• Type-14 variable-resolution tenprint image record 
• Type-15 variable-resolution palmprint image record 
• Type-16 User-defined testing image record 
 Record Formats (ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2000) 
 
F. BIOMETRIC APPLICATION FLOW REQUIREMENTS 
Biometric data must flow from those who are gathering the data and then into the 
BFC’s huge database, ABIS, which processes it.  This process can be done several 
different ways.  The way this chapter will describe it is the way the USSOCOM-NPS 
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Cooperative Field Experimentation Program has been testing the network flow of 
fingerprints from a “suspect” or an “unknown individual.”  
USSOCOM-NPS Cooperative Field Experimentation Program takes the suspects 
fingerprints, usually 10-print rolled, on the Cross Match device shown in Figure 15.  This 
is a kit that was purchased by USSOCOM that was utilized by the BFC during the TNT 
exercises.  It’s important to note that the BFC does not endorse any biometric product. 
 
Figure 14. Cross Match jump kit the BFC uses per USSOCOM. 
 
In the lower left corner of Figure 14 is the Cross Match #ID 442 R device which 
has the Live Scan capabilities that captures the image of fingerprints.  It’s similar to the 
large Live Scanners used at Police Departments, only miniaturized.  The ID 442 R is 
hardwire connected to the CF-18 Panasonic Toughbook laptop.  The laptop has the Cross 
Match software installed on it, so when fingerprints are taken they are automatically 
displayed on the screen.  The software will make a beep and display a still image of the 
prints if they are accepted by the software.  Another way the Cross Match system 
displays acceptance or rejection of prints taken is if the corresponding little round lights 
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located to the left of the ID 442 R and above the blue rim of the scanner light up green for 
accept and red for reject (refer to Figure 14).   
1. 10 – print Rolled Fingerprints  
The process to gather 10-print rolled fingerprints is one where each individual 
finger print is not only placed flat, but rolled onto the Cross Match scanner.  The fingers 
are placed on their side on top of the Cross Match scanner and then rolled across the 
scanner until they reach the opposite side.  This insures that all of the data possible is 
collected from that fingerprint.  This is the most complete way to obtain all the 
fingerprint data possible. 
2. 10 – print Flat Fingerprints 
10 print flat fingerprints actually consist of 2 “slaps,” one from each hand that 
consists of the four fingers starting from the pinkie ending with the index.  The right hand 
is placed on the Cross Match scanner first then the left. Then both of the thumbs are 
placed on the scanner and are captured.  This is a quicker method of fingerprinting, but is 
necessarily not the best way.  The current standards and industry prefer using 10-prints 
because more information is gathered.  That’s why the 10-print rolled is preferred 
because it allows for the sides of the fingers to be captured as well.  The importance of 
this is explained in the Latent fingerprint section. 
3. Latent Fingerprints 
The current systems used to collect fingerprints are not sophisticated enough to 
capture a fingerprint that is left behind.  Latent fingerprints are ones that are manually 
captured by a human from an object.  It is a forensic scenario and the person capturing 
the fingerprints use a soft brush and powder (magnetic or florescent) or they could use a 
special adhesive tape.   Rolled fingerprint information is very important, especially in a 
case of identifying latent fingerprints.  For example, if there is a latent print that is being 
lifted from piece of debris that was from an IED, it might only be a partial print that is the 
side of a finger.  This instance is where having a rolled fingerprint as opposed to a flat 





G. STEPS OF THE CROSS MATCH APPLICATION 
When gathering fingerprints while using the Cross match application, one must 
first fill out the steps that are listed in the flow chart below in Figure 15.  Figures 16-23 
show exactly the fields the must be filled out.  Then the finger prints can be rolled and 
Figure 24 is the result.  All the information is then sent to the ABIS database to see if 
there is an “ident,” that is when someone has been enrolled previously and are in the 
system or if it is an “non ident” which is when there is no match.   
 
 






Figure 16. First Step – Operations Information (screen shot taken from personal use 
of Cross Match software during field experiments) 
 
In the first step, the following fields needs to be filled out:  
 Type of operations 
 Subject/Person 




Figure 17. Second Step – Transaction (screen shot taken from personal use of Cross 
Match software during field experiments) 
 






Figure 18. Third Step – Personal (screen shot taken from personal use of Cross Match 
software during field experiments) 
 





Figure 19. Fourth Step – Personal Identification (screen shot taken from personal use 
of Cross Match software during field experiments) 
 




Figure 20. Fifth Step – Additional Information (screen shot taken from personal use 
of Cross Match software during field experiments) 
 




Figure 21. Sixth Step, Passport Information Section (screen shot taken from personal 
use of Cross Match software during field experiments) 
 




Figure 22. Seventh Step – Passport Information #1 (screen shot taken from personal 
use of Cross Match software during field experiments) 
 




Figure 23. Eighth Step – Physical Description (screen shot taken from personal use of 
Cross Match software during field experiments) 
 
The following fields must be filled out: 
 Gender 
 Race 
 Color Eyes 







Figure 24. Ninth Step – Finger prints (screen shot taken from personal use of Cross 
Match software during field experiments) 
 
 
All 10 fingerprints are enrolled using a scanner and then they are displayed 
digitally.  At this time, all of the Figures are considered one file and can be sent to the 









H.  BIOMETRIC MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 
There are many measures of performance (MOP) one could look at in the realm of 
biometrics.  For instance the quality of sample taken, image resolution, correct count of 
minutiae, and many other criteria used in different ways to determine measures of 
performance of a device that one is using.  The Biometrics Fusion Center tests and 
evaluates biometric systems for EBTS/EFTS compliance.  The FBI certifies 10-print 
rolled biometric scanners for image quality.  The MOP’s that will be looked at are the 
ones that relate to the way that we used biometrics in the USSOCOM-NPS field 
experiments.     
The time it takes to enroll a person is a critical element in a tactical situation.  The 
device used is a deciding factor in this situation.  If you are using a device that can only 
take one fingerprint at a time then the time to take a full set of ten-prints is greatly 
increased.  If you are able to take the “slaps” of the four fingers and then the two thumbs 
together, then your time is reduced, but the sides of the fingers are not captured.  
Currently, there is no solution to have both speed and completeness, one must decide 
what is more valuable for their situation. 
An important measure of performance for the experiments, because it directly 
translates to what would happen in real life, is the delay of transmission of the 
fingerprints.  Rapid identification verification of an unknown person is crucial in a real 
life situation.  The soldiers on the ground do not want to be waiting around for very long 
if they have a hostile suspect they are trying to control or if they are in a vulnerable spot 
that could be attacked.  Time is of the essence in the tactical environment.  This is when 
the network that the solider has available to him is of the utmost importance.  The crux is 
the time it takes to reach back to the ABIS database. 
Another measure of performance is once the data has arrived via the network to 
ABIS database, how long does it take to have the fingerprints processed?  The time it 
takes to determine if there is a positive identification or non-identification is valuable, 
and therefore must be as short as possible. Once the fingerprints have been processed, 
then the results will need to be sent back to the solider who is waiting for the response.   
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I.  CONCLUSIONS 
Besides there being biometric standards there are networking and operational 
standards that need to be considered.  Using the correct network in different situations is 
key to how quickly one can get a response from the ABIS database.  Considering the 
environment in which the finger printing is taking place also plays an important role.   
For instance, CONOPS for biometric identification in a tactical network is not known.  
The next chapter explores how using the USSOCOM-Naval Postgraduate School Field 
Experimentation Program provides the unique capability for evaluating the biometric 
identification process requirements in emerging tactical networks.  
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V. RESULTS FROM THE FIELD EXPERIMENTS 
In August of 2005 the USSOCOM-NPS Cooperative Field Experimentation 
Program started experimenting with the use of Biometric Fusion Center’s products.  The 
BFC has participated in every experiment since then.  They usually bring their Cross 
Match #ID 442 R system to use during the scenarios.  At the beginning of each of the 
following sections will be a brief description of that iteration’s scenario, this is because 
they vary and change each time.  A high value target (HVT) or a person of suspicion or 
interest is who the BFC is looking for within the TNT scenarios.  The steps of conducting 
the BFC’s work are acquiring the biometric identifiers, transmitting, matching and then 
returning the results of biometric identifiers. 
A. TNT 05-4 
1. Camp Roberts (August 29-2 September 2005) 
Part of the premise for the August 2005, TNT 05-4 scenario was a High Value 
Target (HVT) search in 3 buildings located in the Camp Roberts facility.  A dismounted 
team of soldiers, the “ODA team” equipped with a picture of the HVT, Tacticomps, 3 
HMMWV’s, and an LRV, entered into each building and secured it.  Per the script 
written for this scenario, one building was found completely empty.  The second building 
did not have any HVTs but did reveal WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and IED 
(improvised explosive device) materials.  The “ODA team” secured the materials and left 
a surveillance camera and proceeded to building three.  The last building did contain one 
HVT.  Once the “ODA team” confirmed that the HVT was the same as the in their 
picture, they brought him outside and processed him for fingerprints.  Several questions 
were asked in order to complete the data input required for what was a one gigabit file 
once the rolled 10-prints were taken.   
The scenario was conducted twice, each time using a different network to send the 
information back the BFC for processing.  August 30, 2005 was scheduled for the first 
run of the scenario with the use of Iridium Satellite, but was delayed until the next day.  
The reason for the delay was that Hurricane Katrina Relief efforts had priority in the 
Iridium Satellite system and all other users lost their service.  In light of this the scenario 
was slightly modified and instead of using Iridium for reachback, other technologies were 
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utilized.  On August 30, 2005, 3 tethered balloons with ITT Mesh provided primary 
communications between the LRV and TOC (in place of Iridium).  On August 31, the 
Iridium services were restored and utilized.   
High Value Target Identification was accomplished by first posting the biometrics 
sensor data output in the Groove workspace, shared by LRV, TOC, NPS NOC, and 
Biometrics Fusion Center (DoD BFC).  DoD BFC could open that file out of the shared 
workspace that was being connected by Verizon or Iridium to the TOC, then a VPN 
connection from the NPS NOC to DoD BFC.  Once the BFC received that data, they 
processed it.  Biometrics identification data, (seen below) was returned into the shared 
workspace from DoD BFC: 






ABIS#: 000138087 DATE RECEIVED: 20050826 
SEX RACE BIRTH DATE HEIGHT WEIGHT EYES HAIR 
M W 1963/09/24 510 160 BN BN 
ARRESTED OR RECEIVED: 20050320 
CHARGE: SUSPECT OF IED CELL 
LOCATION: OLDSMAR, FLORIDA (TNT 05-4 AAR, p.6) 
 
As discussed above, HVT biometric data was transmitted from the field to the 
TOC two ways.  The first way used an Iridium network, which reflects current 
capabilities.  Processing this information via Iridium took at least 70 minutes.  70 minutes 
is a time threshold that exceeds what most soldiers are willing to wait.  The second form 
of transmission was an advanced network using the ITT mesh and the LRV.  The ITT 
mesh network required 12 minutes for results to reach the operator (TNT 05-4 AAR, p. 
iii)  Examining the difference of times (12 minutes versus 70 minutes to complete this 
task) demonstrates that the type of network can have a great impact on the speed of field 
operations (TNT 05-4 AAR, p.6)   
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2. Monterey Bay (August 22-25, 2005) 
This was an exercise of capabilities that could be used during a Maritime 
Interdiction Operation (MIO) experiment.  It was conducted in the Monterey Bay using 
wireless 802.16 as a reachback from the ship-to-shore, from the shore to the NPS NOC, 
and from the NOC to the BFC via a VPN.  The USCG HAWKSBILL cutter was used as 
the ship being boarded by the NPS, BFC, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) teams.  The purpose of the exercise was to provide boarding parties with near-
real time feedback of biometric screening and radiation detection\signatures on a boarded 
vessel.  Below is a section taken from LT Marvin’s thesis, because it best explains the 
sequence of events that took place: 
 
To be tested was the Man-Pack OFDM backhaul link, LLNL Ultra-
Wideband (UWB) interface and portable biometrics gathering equipment.  
Network availability was provided by the 802.16/OFDM backbone from 
the Beach Lab, and Man-Pack 802.16/OFDM to Biometrics, UWB, video, 
and Radiation detection devices. 
Network availability and capability was then tested throughout the 
boarding evolution conducted on USS HAWKSBILL.     
Network availability was tested to the most remote node (UWB) and Man-
Pack 802.16/OFDM throughout the boarding evolution to determine the 
effects of bulkhead and deck penetration of UWB and backhaul distance 
from HAWKSBILL to CYPRESS SEA effect on the OFDM link. 
EVENT 1 
NPS Man-Pack, LLNL UWB, Biometrics Fusion Team, and IST 
development teams boarded the USS HAWKSBILL.  UWB, Boarding 
Officer, and Radiation detection, and Biometrics teams established and 
stabilized boarding team LAN on target vessel. Man-Pack Operator 
established OFDM link to CYPRESS SEA and sent audio/video link via 
Groove workspace to collaborative partners. 
EVENT 2  
Biometrics fusion team established connectivity and began gathering and 
processing biometrics from suspect vessel crew via reach back to the 




After OFDM link was established, LLNL team interfaced UWB with the 
OFDM link and streamed video back to the NOC. 
EVENT 4 
LLNL team used a portable radiation detector to evaluate potential cargo 
of interest onboard USS HAWKSBILL.  Radiation data was streamed 
through the OFDM backbone and associated portal to LLNL remote 
technical assistance engineers for identification. 
EVENT 5 
While boarding teams were aboard HAWKSBILL the IST development 
team observed and documented ergonomic and functional requirements 
for future under-development portable radiation detection and source 
identification units.  (Marvin, p.53) 
The MIO exercise tested collaborative software, situational awareness tools, 
wireless 802.16 technology, including the mobile 802.16, the Man-Pack, radiation 
detection, UWB, and biometrics.  All parties involved in the operational exercise 
communicated in a virtual workspace, called Groove.  LLNL detected radiation and 
communicated within the ship using ultra wideband technology.  Ultra wideband is a low 
frequency, broad band technology that can penetrate through a ship’s haul or through 
steel containers.  Using Groove, the BFC provided near real-time, automatic biometric 
feedback on those persons encountered during operational exercise.   Timing between the 
boat and the BFC was never actually measured because this was the first initial test of 
feasibility.  The main question was “is it possible to send biometrics from a target ship?”  
The answer was yes, but timing at this point was not a MOP. 
B.  TNT 06-1 
In November 2005 the first experiment of the 2006 fiscal year was conducted. 
1. Camp Roberts (November 12-18, 2005): 
Below is a description of the two scenarios that were accomplished. 
Scenario # 1a and #1b 
Operators were conducting routine check point (CP) operations when a suspicious 
individual tried to cross the bridge into the controlled area. UAVs were providing 
surveillance and security flights in the vicinity of the bridge.  The individual was taken 
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under control and moved to a secure holding area to the side of the bridge. A picture of 
the individual was sent to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). A 10-print method of 
biometrics ID was utilized.  The forward deployed (FD) CP operators had a laptop that 
had the ability to input this biometric data.  They also had a Transaction Manager Viewer 
laptop.   
The 10-print data were sent via the TNT network to the BFC.  Two variations of 
the TNT network were evaluated.  The first (Scenario #1a) had the Light Reconnaissance 
Vehicle (LRV) located on a hill ~300 meters from the CP.  The LRV had line-of-site 
(LOS) to the CP and to the TOC.  ITT mesh was the comms between the CP and LRV.  
Then from the LRV to TOC, high throughput 802.16 was used.  Scenario #1b imitated 
the possibility that the LRV may not be able to obtain LOS to both the CP and TOC.  So 
instead, a tethered balloon was raised to provide the ITT mesh network communications 
between the CP and the TOC.  Rather than have the LRV as comms node, there was an 
end-to-end ITT mesh network (TNT 06-1 Scenarios, p.2). 
Scenarios #2a and #2b 
Through human intelligence sources, the TOC learned that an important Al Qaeda 
leader will make his way over the bridge to attend a meeting. The TOC asked for this 
vehicle to be identified and marked with a tag if possible while it is on the bridge. While 
the target vehicle waited in line on the bridge, operators placed a tag on it. The TOC 
airboss decided to put the longer endurance Tern UAV in the air and directed it to take a 
picture of the vehicle and to maintain Surveillance and Reconnaissance (S&R) and to 
determine any potential meeting location.  Once the threat vehicle passed through the CP 
it evaded the Tern’s S&R.  TOC directed appropriate UAVs (Raven, Pointer, Tern, NPS 
SUAV) to conduct simultaneous search missions in the most likely areas.  Once located, 
the “ODA team” proceeded to the vehicle and observed from distance that driver had 
departed.  Vehicle then became a potential IED.  Some UAVs were re-tasked to search 
for the high value target (HVT) in the vicinity of vehicle and provided S&R of possible 
IED vehicle. Once a UAV located the HVT on foot, TOC directed the “ODA team” to 
that location so that they would take the HVT under control.  The operators took a ten-
print and facial picture from the HVT. The fingerprint data was sent for ID as in 
Scenarios #1. The facial image was sent to the TOC.  Once the operators received 
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positive ID, they moved back to the TOC with the HVT and the mission was completed.  
Meanwhile, the UAVs were assisting in determining the status of the IED and its 
disposal. (TNT 06-1 Scenarios, p.2) 
These scenarios were made feasible by using collaborative tools.  Groove was 
used for collaboration between UAV operators at local and remote sites and for 
collaboration of the LRV with the BFC.  VPN between the BFC and Camp Roberts was 
established and functioned properly.  (TNT 06-1 AAR, p.5) 
Ten-prints were sent from the field to the BFC Automated Biometrics 
Identification System (ABIS) emulator (the operational ABIS was not used) through a 
hardware enabled VPN.   Using a hardware VPN concentrator at the BFC allowed access 
to several BFC servers with different databases needed for biometrics identification (TNT 
06-1 AAR, p.7-8).   Figure 25 pictorially dictates the network flow diagram for 
biometrics sharing.  We successfully demonstrated advanced HVT Identification from the 
field by transmitting a ten fingerprint file to the Biometrics Fusion Center and receiving a 




Figure 25. Biometric Network Flow Diagram for TNT 06-1 (Provided by Viars, 
BFC) 
 
2. San Francisco/Alameda Island MIO (November 20-22 2005) 
The basic scenario for this experiment was drafted by Dr. Bordetsky and the 
following is a synopsis:  After gathering intelligence and authorizations of both US and 
Country X Governments, the USCG has ordered one of its cutters to stop, board, and 
search a vessel suspected of transporting uranium enriching equipment and explosives 
from Country Y to a terrorist cell.  In trying to locate uranium enriching equipment and 
explosives, and while minimizing disruption to Country X’s main port, the USCG 
Operations Center, Alameda has directed its cutter to employ radiation detection, 
explosives detection, and biometric equipment to expedite the at-sea search.  Since 
positive identification of the source in a short time is imperative, a wireless network 
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extension capability was to be extended from the cutter to the boarding team.  That 
network reached back to LLNL and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to 
assist in identification of suspect cargo.  Support from the DoD Biometrics Fusion Center 
must be used to quickly and accurately discriminate between actual vessel crewmembers 
and non-crew suspects (TNT 06-1 MIO, p3).   
Docked ships at the MARAD (Maritime Administration) station on Alameda 
Island were used to simulate at-sea conditons.   One was a crane ship, called the GEM 
State and one was a cargo vessel ship named the Admiral W.M. Callaghan.  GEM State 
was the simulated USCG Cutter and the Admiral W.M Callaghan was the boarded ship 
with suspect cargo and personnel.   
The objectives of this experiment were to continue to test the ability of a Boarding 
Party to rapidly set-up ship-to-ship communications that allow it to search for radiation 
and explosive sources and identify personnel while keeping in contact with the 
originating ship and so that remote collaboration with sensor experts can be possible.   
The schedule of events was as follows: 
Event 1 
OFDM link was established between USCG Headquarters, Alameda and 
the support ship GEM STATE.   
Event 2 
Boarding team (to include Boarding Officer, Assistant Boarding Officer 
with networks expertise and 802.16/OFDM Man-Pack radio, LLNL UWB 
and Radiation Sensor teams, and Biometrics Collection Team) boarded the 
ADMIRAL CALLAHAN and set up 802.16/OFDM network extension to 
the GEM STATE.  LLNL and Biometrics Collection Teams began setting 
up and stabilizing a LAN with the Boarding Officer.  Event 2 was 
complete when the LAN and link between the ADMIRAL CALLAHAN 
and the GEM STATW was operational. 
Event 3 
Biometrics fusion team began gathering and sending biometrics from the 
suspect vessel’s crew to the Biometrics Fusion Center via network (TNT 
test-bed VPN).  The Biometrics Fusion Center evaluated the biometrics 




Radiation detection team with portable radiation detectors evaluated 
suspect cargo and began sending radiation detection information from 
their location via the network (UWB-to-OFDM backbone-to-VPN portal) 
to LLNL for technical analysis.  Streaming Video data was also sent to 
LLNL and DTRA for analysis support.  The Boarding Officer collaborated 
over Groove with higher headquarters (USCG Headquarters, Alameda) 
and Centers of Excellence (LLNL, BFC, and DTRA) to support analysis 
and situational awareness of all organizations.   
Event 5  
While boarding teams were aboard the ADMIRAL CALLAHAN, the 
LLNL team observed and documented ergonomic and functional 
requirements for future development of portable radiation detection and 
source identification units. 
Event 6 
Retrograde from ADMIRAL CALLAHAN and GEM STATE and USCG 
Headquarters, Alameda occurred.  Pre-experiment conditions at each 
location were restored.  Appropriate check out was conducted with 
supporting organizations. (TNT 06-1 MIO, p3).   
The results from TNT 06-1 MIO scenario were successful.  An advanced ship-to-
ship communication network capability was setup within 15 minutes.  Because of this, 
both biometric and radiation detection data were quickly and accurately transmitted to the 
BFC and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  The response time for biometrics 
data sharing and response from the BFC was reduced to 4 min.  (TNT 06-1 AAR, p.10) 
C. TNT 06-2  
TNT 06-2 was conducted in the second quarter FY 06; in Monterey, CA from 20-
24 February at Camp Roberts, CA from 27 February-3 March 2006, and in Alameda, CA 
from 5-7 March 2006.  The Monterey portion that was carried out during 20-24 February 
did not contain biometrics. 
1. Camp Roberts (27 February - 3 March 2006) 
The main scenario which BFC participated in was a scenario of a red force 
passing through a checkpoint and blue team trying to identify them.  The scenario 
simulated operations that were occurring in several locations at different times in which 
biometrics and INTEL were collected.  Data mining and analysis, provided by Brandes 
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Assoc. RMITS, were utilized to identify that there was a threat of HVTs.  A convoy was 
deployed to man a checkpoint.  The CP had biometrics for ID of personnel (BFC ten-
prints and BFC latent print extraction).  Six UAVs were simultaneously utilized in an air-
space-deconflicted, optimized search to locate the HVTs.  Each operating area had an 
ITT Mesh cluster which was linked through the 802.16 long-haul backbone to the TOC 
using mobile TOCs (i.e. NPS LRV).  The TOC was linked to multiple remote sites 
including the BFC (Clarksburg, WVa), USFS (Missoula, MT) via VPN, and to Avon 
Park, FL via SATCOM/VPN. 
There were capabilities shown for biometrics collection and data transmission that 
were dramatic.  The results of this scenario showed that the ten-print files were collected 
and sent from the field to the BFC with a response obtained in an average of four 
minutes.  Figure 26 shows the flow of biometrics during this experiment. This scenario 
also called for the demonstration of latent print lift capability.  Prints were collected by a 
professional latent lifter and then sent to the BFC database, evaluated, and a response 
received within 30 minutes.  BFC had very positive results using their Automated 
Biometrics Identification Systems (ABIS) Emulator ten-print record matching capability. 




Figure 26. Biometric Network Flow Diagram for TNT 06-2 (Provided by Viars, 
BFC) 
 
2. San Francisco MIO (March 5-7, 2006) 
The scenario of TNT 06-2 for Maritime Interdiction Operations portion of the 
experiments strived to be a real life scenario that is fundamental to all agencies and 
institutions involved in homeland security operations, specifically, those related to 
maritime interdiction.  
According to intelligence, a cargo vessel that departed country X in early 
February was carrying a terrorist cell with hazardous (radiological) 
material and was attempting to enter the country via a West coast port. 
The Vessel’s name and port of arrival are unknown. 
Multiple boarding operations are ongoing (and updates are posting to 
Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center - MIFC via E-Wall).  Intel provided 
updated information and gave high confidence that a vessel entering 
62 
Washington State had the terrorists onboard.  USCG and NSWC decided 
to coordinate the vessel’s takedown. 
Under that course of action, USCG ordered one of its vessels (simulated 
by MARAD SS Gem State) to stop, board, and search a ship (simulated by 
USCG Cutter, called the Tern) suspected of transporting radiological 
material as well as a terrorist cell. In order to do that, while the suspect 
vessel is underway, a RHIB with a boarding team was employed.  
Level I boarding team conducted a search of the vessel due to its status as 
a high interest vessel (HIV). They were equipped with radioactive 
detectors. During the inspection, a neutron alarm was triggered on a 
radioactive detector. The alarm was a constant alarm, not spurious counts. 
The Level I team called in a Level II team to resurvey the ship with their 
additional radiation detection equipment.  
So, in order to assist in locating suspects, uranium enriching equipment 
and explosives, the USCG Operations Center, Alameda directed its Level 
II boarding team to employ radiation detection, explosives detection, and 
biometric equipment to help expedite this at-sea search.  Since there are 
numerous commercial uses for certain radioactive sources and positive 
identification of the source in a short time is imperative, a network 
extension capability was utilized from the suspect vessel to the boarding 
team’s launch vessel and ashore. This rapidly deployable, collaborative 
network reached back to LLNL and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA) to assist in identification of suspect cargo.  Support from the 
Biometrics Fusion Center must be used to quickly and accurately 
discriminate between actual vessel crewmembers and non-crew suspects.  
The tasking for Level II boarding team was to conduct a survey of the 
cargo ship and identify the source of the neutron readings. Also, using 
biometrics recording devices, crew members must take fingerprints and 
that biometrics data had to be to BFC for identification. 
The expected boarding scenario events were:  
• Hidden neutron source in engine room and hidden gamma source 
as cargo. BFC fingerprints Captain and crew. 
• First gamma spectrum of gamma source taken is poorly done 
because the boarding party took too short of a spectrum. 
Reachback can ask for second spectrum for analysis. Gamma 
spectrum of neutron source and photos sent to reachback and 
export control for identification.  
• Once the identification of the items is passed to the boarding team 
and fed to MIFC, the cognitive process clock starts where the 
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experts work in collaboration with MIFC and USCG support 
vessel to understand the situation and come up with a course of 
action to deal with the threat. 
• Once the captain of the ship is located, he can inform the boarding 
party that he had a soil density gauge that emitted neutrons (but 
only after we send spectra and photos of item).  Export control 
should identify it as soil density gauge. Unfortunately, it was 
stolen. The captain can’t explain the gamma source- possible 
terrorist threat? Captain’s fingerprints show him to be on a watch 
list. 
The radiological material was simulated by detection files that provided 
the LLNL analysis team with some ambiguity about the severity of the 
material. Once that determination was passed to the boarding team and fed 
to MIFC, the cognitive process clock started where the experts work in 
collaboration with MIFC, USCG and boarding team to understand the 
situation and come up with a course of action to deal with the threat.  
(TNT 06-2 MIO) 
The team was able to carry out the scenario with success and received viable 
results for all concerned.  Biometrics was able to identify the crew members and the key 
was to keep the biometric exchange flowing while the target boat was on the move 
utilizing 802.16 and 802.20. 
D. TNT 06-3 
 1.  Camp Roberts (June 3-9, 2006)  
The main scenario for TNT 06-3 was: “Force-on-Force”.  There was a blue force, 
which consisted of multiple types of UAS’s, TOC, etc. who’s goal was to find the red 
force, which in turn consisted of 3 SORSE (special operations research and support 
element) soldiers on ATV’s (all terrain vehicles).  The scenario started at 1300 and lasted 
until 0100, so that both EO and IR cameras could be tested.  The red team was instructed 
to stay above a 35 degrees and 45 minutes line, north of the TOC until 1800.  At that 
point they were allowed to penetrate closer to the TOC.  During a predetermined time of 
the scenario, the red team would (purposefully) cross through a checkpoint and be 
fingerprinted.  The BFC local database (in the TOC), called the Mobile Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (MAFIS) was used to match the fingerprints against a 
list of about 100 people that had been downloaded from ABIS.  A response was 
generated by the local database at the TOC.  Two ‘Hit’ and one ‘No Hit’ responses were 
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received by the enrollment unit because only two members of the red team were 
previously enrolled for the scenario.  Results for the matching took only 2 minutes.  See 
Figure 27 for the biometric data flow.  
 
Figure 27. Biometric Network Flow Diagram for TNT 06-3 (Provided by Viars, 
BFC) 
 
 2.  San Francisco MIO (June 13-15, 2006) 
The scenario for the MIO portion of TNT 06-3 was very similar to those in the 
past.  Below is narrative of the background of the scenario: 
A month ago, an Austrian border facility’s sensor detected a radiological 
source, but the alarm failed to activate and the truck was able to continue 
on without being searched.  It apparently delivered its cargo to a port on 
the Baltic Sea.  There were several ships in port at that time.  It was 
reported that a truck of similar type loaded cargo on a vessel of Swedish 
Registry. Once the sensor malfunction was uncovered, the Swedish 
Authorities were notified and subsequently conducted a search of the 
suspect vessel.  That search found no radiological material. A list of ships 
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in the port in the time frame of the shipment was developed.  One ship was 
headed to the Caribbean with several stops and finally to a Mexican port.  
Arrangements were made to search the vessel when it arrived in the 
Mexican port.  No sources of radiation were found on the ship.  The 
Austrian’s provided the sensor data to the Swedes; the data is troublesome 
in that it indicates a possible Pu source as there was both gammas and 
neutrons measured. The Austrian’s and Swedes have (scenario 
assumption) an agreement which authorizes a collaborative effort between 
their country’s (military/law enforcement) teams to continue to determine 
what the source was and ensure that appropriate action is taken with 
respect to it (TNT 06-3 MIO).  
Based on this background, intelligence reports were received that indicated a 
cargo vessel was carrying a hazardous (radiological) material.  The vessel and its cargo 
are attempting to enter the country via a West Coast port.  The United States Coast Guard 
decided to conduct a Maritime Interdiction Operation.  After boarding the vessel, the 
search team located a hidden neutron source in the engine room and finds a hidden 
gamma source onboard as cargo.  Fingerprints were taken of the captain and crew.  The 
response file was supposed to have returned from the captain’s fingerprint file showing 
that he has an outstanding warrant.  Prior to the experiment starting, the captain’s 
fingerprints were loaded as a print that was to be identified as a suspect.  Unfortunately, 
the prints were not properly loaded, and therefore all prints taken during experiment came 
back as “No Hit.”  Biometrics personnel enrolled and submitted the fingerprints to 
Biometrics MAFIS Computer, located in TOC, via the 802.16 connection between the 
boarded vessel and the TOC.  Biometrics MAFIS computer automatically replied, within 
2 minutes. Biometrics personnel also took three sets of prints, via Biometrics Enrollment 
laptop, and files were made available to Biometrics MAFIS computer at TOC.  
Biometrics MAFIS provided “No Hits” on watch list for all three prints.   
The following should be noted regarding this experiment:  
The current database used in this experiment only held less than 100 
people and only matched right indexes.  The outstanding warrant enrollee 
was not identified during the experiment.  For testing purposes, the 
enrollee's fingerprints were captured again.  The file was matched only to 
the print that was captured during the scenario.  This error could be the 
result of poor fingerprints, an incorrectly connected fingerprint matching 
license key, or possibly the limited ‘right index’ search capability (TNT 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There were several measures of performance that were looked at.  One of them 
was the completeness of the fingerprint taken.  For most of the experiments a device that 
could accommodate rolling the finger from side to side was used.  That was the most 
complete amount of information that could be taken of ones’ fingerprint.  In TNT 06-3 a 
smaller device that only took flat (not rolled) fingerprints was taken and therefore there 
was less information, but it was completed in less time, because only the two thumbs and 
two index fingers were gathered. 
One of the main measures of performance that was evaluated was the length of 
time that it took to transmit the fingerprint data from the field back to the ABIS database.  
Although this was not measured in every experiment, there was a range of times and 
during each subsequent experiment there were quicker turn around times.  The longest 
time that was observed was 70 minutes (using low bandwidth Satellite communications), 
while the shortest time was 4 minutes for reachback to ABIS and 2 minutes for a local 
database.  Lifting latent fingerprints and sending them took a grand total of 30 minutes to 
retrieve a response.  Please see Figure 28 for brief summary of the type of networks used 
and times of for responses for each event. 
Another MOP was the network environment that was in place in order to conduct 
and run a full set of prints.  There are key components used in the network.  For example 
was it wired or wireless?  How far is the network being stretched?  Is it going through a 
satellite, a VPN, or is it local?  All of these could factor into how long it takes or if one 
can process fingerprints. 
One also needs to take into account the applications used.  Is Cross Match being 
used to gather the data or another application?  What kind of method is being used to 
send the information back to the database?  Is it being sent via Groove or file transfer?  
All of these factors can make a difference. 
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Figure 28. Evolution of Biometrics Identification Performance through TNT 
Experiments 
 
The USSOCOM-NPS Cooperative Field Experimentation Program proved that 
biometrics is feasible at the tactical level, while having remote access with the BFC.  The 
times to obtain identification were primarily due to the megabit size file that was being 
transmitted.  In the last experiment the time required was as little as 2-4 minutes. 
One must keep in mind that because the fingerprint files are large (~1 megabit), 
they do require either very large bandwidth or significant time to transmit.  
Communications robustness and speed will be critical if the identification cannot be made 
on-site with a local database.  The current policy is off-site identification and off-site 
links to related intelligence matches.  Quick identifications based on limited data sets 
may be done at forward areas without transmitting real-time (TNT 06-1 AAR, p.7-8). 
Fingerprint acquisition tools are somewhat large for full tactical use, and require 
minutes to collect valid prints.  This may be insufficient in some environments.  The form 
factor could be made smaller and more portable.  If these issues were looked at and 
improved, then the warfighter might be willing to include this technology in their already 
overloaded required gear as shown in Figure 1.  Utilizing multiple biometric measures 
may actually result in shorter transmit and database search times. 
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This thesis modeled and structured the process of biometric identification in a 
testbed environment.  It showed that the biometric process was improved through each 
consecutive experiment.  It is these improvements which lead to operationally viable 
results of receiving biometric response within minutes.  This thesis concludes that this 
technology has great potential for fighting the war on terrorism and warrants continued 
studies.  Possible areas of future research are: smaller/portable devices, local databases or 
“watch lists”, optimal networks for reachback to ABIS, emerging reliable biometrics, 
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